Informal local governance institutions (ILGIs) are complex organisations, which continue to be prevalent at village level in rural India. Although generally perceived by educated Indians to be "oppressive", ILGIs also have progressive features and often perform a range of useful, collective functions at the village level.
Caste profile of ILGI leaders in 30 villages in Karnataka 6 (Gupta 2001) .
Not only are ILGIs prevalent in rural India but, as I show below, they are also highly institutionalised: they embody stable, recurring and valued behaviour patterns (Huntington 1965 ). Yet we know relatively little about them, and there is a great difference between reality and the beliefs held by urban and middle class Indians, that are shaped principally by newspaper reports, but also by some social science literature. The typical urban perception is that ILGIs are:
1. Essentially instruments of caste dominance, that either simply represent a single caste or, where they include representatives of more than one caste, are controlled by the locally dominant caste.
2. Oppressive in nature, serving solely or mainly to enforce "traditional" norms and hierarchies, notably in relation to caste and gender.
3. Shrinking or fading in face of modernity, especially in the face of competition from the formal, elected local village councils (Grama Panchayats).
These popular beliefs may not be entirely wrong. However, the full picture is more complex. ILGIs have "functional" and "progressive", as well as "oppressive" features. They interact with formal local government institutions. And they sometimes perform broad developmental roles, as well as acting as mechanisms of (repressive) social control. The purpose of this paper is to tell these other sides of the story. It is based in part on the existing literature on informal local institutions in India and elsewhere. The 1. Typically are inter-caste institutions, comprising the leaders of different caste groups in a community, and are in some real sense representative bodies whose procedures are characterised more by deliberation, negotiation, and compromise than by simple rule enforcement.
2. Do not only enforce "traditional" rules and norms, but also perform a range of useful collective functions at the village level, often in a consensual manner. They arbitrate a range of disputes at the village level, act as support structures by providing monetary and other assistance to people in distress, and, as Wade (1988) found in Andhra Pradesh state, often mobilise significant sums of financial and other resources for developmental projects.
The composition of ILGIs in Karnataka
Indian society is very much (self-) organised around cellular units -mainly caste. But that organisation is so natural and implicit that, when researchers ask people about existing "associations" and their activities, they often do not find anything, or are directed towards modern associations formed under the influence of external interventions of various kinds. This is true of Karnataka. In reality, a profusion of local organisations, structured mainly around individual caste groups, exist in the villages. These may be intravillage caste panchayats and/or street panchayats 3 (for a single street or a group of streets). These organisations operate at sub-village level and have limited authority -restricted to a caste group in the case of caste panchayats or limited to the population of a street or few streets in case of street panchayats. The ILGI is a higher level organisation, with jurisdiction over the entire village, that essentially comprises a "congress" of these sub-village caste organisations. Authority over the entire village allows the ILGI to act as a higher forum for "appeals" if issues are not satisfactorily resolved in lower bodies. These wholevillage organisations, that I term ILGIs, are among the more widely-found of a set of informal, castebased local governance institutions that vary from place to place. For a further understanding of this distinction between nucleated villages and natural villages, see 'The Dominant Caste in Rampura' (Srinivas 2002) .
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I came across street panchayats in only one big village where the ILGI was relatively weak. 4 During the colonial period, these three districts belonged to different regions. Mysore was the capital of princely state of Mysore, Dharwad belonged to Bombay Presidency and Raichur was part of Hyderabad State under the rule of the Nizam of Hyderabad. These three districts represent regions with distinctive agrarian structures, agricultural development patterns, and social and cultural backgrounds.
by the former Dharwad district, the terms pancharu or Hireru (village elders) are prevalent, while in one village the ILGI is known as the Civic Board. In Raichur district the common term is Daiva (God).
This diversity of names indicates the diverse nature of the institution itself. Throughout Karnataka
ILGIs seem to have a common core agenda of upholding social norms and customs and preserving local law and order. At the same time, they also find ways to adapt to differing and changing contexts. The resilience and adaptability of ILGIs derive in large measure from the caste system. Caste is not as inflexible and rigid as is often supposed, and has survived the advent of democracy and the forces of modernisation. Contrary to "optimistic" expectations that it would wilt under the pressure of modernity and (hopefully) wither away, caste has adapted itself to changing contexts. Its role in electoral politics is very evident. Similarly, ILGIs continue to operate at the local level despite the increased importance of their statutory, elected counterparts, the Grama Panchayats. ILGIs might be viewed as a manifestation or extension of the caste system. It should, therefore, induce no surprise that they also share its resilience and adaptability. The basic reasons for this adaptability are common to both cases. The more "traditional" leaderships of ILGIs know that they will lose power and authority unless they adapt the institution to accommodate changes in the broader political context. ILGIs are variable over space and time. But all appear to have visible memberships: a set of people who are recognised as having the right or duty to meet in a structured way to discuss, debate and, sometimes, to decide. I will call these members panchas, employing a term that is no longer widely used in Karnataka;
and will call the leader the Yajamana -a term that is still in widespread use. The nature of membership varies from village to village, and changes a little from time to time within individual villages. However, two facts stand out. First, virtually all panchas are men. The only exceptions I found were that, in two cases (not part of my sample of 30 villages), elected female members of the formal Grama Panchayat were sometimes invited to join in the deliberations of the ILGI for specific purposes. Otherwise, men dominate totally. Second, ILGIs are constituted on the basis of caste, and understood to be so.
Generally, the size of an ILGI is broadly proportional to the number of caste groups present in a village. In all villages the ILGI consists of (a) a core membership representing mainly the leaders of the major caste groups in the village and (b) occasional other members, invited according to context or need.
In most villages, some or all of the core members are viewed as having lifetime tenure unless and until they decide to step down. These are normally people considered to have inherited leadership of a particular caste group. Men's attendance varies from village to village, but in most villages at least one male member from each family -usually the head of the household -is expected to attend. Young men may attend, but are allowed to participate in the discussions only if expressly permitted. Essentially, older men or male heads of the household are expected to represent and speak for the whole family. However the level of participation of the community in ILGI meetings depends upon the gravity of the issues being debated.
The presence of the villagers in ILGI meetings is a way of ensuring community endorsement of decisions.
While ILGIs draw their legitimacy from custom and tradition and are largely rooted in caste, they are not bound by "tradition". They adapt to changing circumstances, as is evidenced by the appearance in some cases of Scheduled Caste leaders or members chosen by virtue of their election to the formal Grama Panchayat. But the change in membership has not extended to include better gender representation. ILGIs are still very patriarchal.
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Relatively better representation of Scheduled Caste leaders in ILGIs in southern Karnataka, to a certain extent, may have its roots in the stronger mobilisation of the Dalit community and a relatively less skewed pattern of land holding there compared to other regions of the state.
Activities of ILGIs
The common outsiders' perception is that ILGIs are relics of the past, trying to maintain their centrality in village governance by reinforcing "traditional" values and norms, generally in an oppressive manner. Most media reports highlight this aspect of ILGIs, and rarely deal with their more positive and practical functions.
Apart from their role as custodians of "traditional" norms and rules, ILGIs in Karnataka perform a wide range of useful, collective activities. These include organising social activities, dispensing informal justice, providing financial and moral support to those in need, and maintenance of local law and order.
ILGIs may perform some or all these functions depending upon their influence and degree of activism.
In all the 30 villages I studied in Karnataka, ILGIs were involved in collecting funds for religious activities, including temple construction, repairs and maintenance; and organising religious festivals, rituals and processions (Jathre). These are important tasks for ILGIs. Village festivals, especially those related to the village deity -grama devathe -are considered to be important social (and religious) events. They not only involve the entire village, but also establish and reinforce social networks with neighbouring villages.
As Mandelbaum (1970) has observed, these village festivals are a manifestation of village solidarity. Villagers do not necessarily see dispute resolution by ILGIs as an end point, but rather as the first opportunity for justice because it is quick, affordable and accessible. 11 In most villages, disputes brought before the ILGIs may be taken to the police station or to the formal legal system if not satisfactorily resolved there. The types of disputes that come before the ILGI are varied. They include petty disputes, thefts, encroachment issues, minor property disputes, drunken brawls, and marital problems including spouse abuse, desertion, bigamy, and alcoholism. Land or property disputes, between siblings and/or other people, are usually brought to the ILGI in the first instance. If they are not resolved to the satisfaction of both parties, then the ILGI advises them to approach the formal institutions of justice.
Criminal cases are handed over to the police. Sexual offences are deemed to be extremely serious, and may lead to the ILGI meting out very heavy penalties.
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While in most cases villagers respect the ILGI as an institution capable of delivering fair judgement, there are instances where ILGIs have been accused of being biased and corrupt.
An intra-caste dispute, in the first instance, is taken to the leader of that particular caste. ILGIs also act as support mechanisms in specific situations. There are a number of cases of their helping destitute or widowed women to get a share of their husbands' property, collecting funds from the villagers to help accident victims (generally from poor families), arranging funeral rites for destitute people, organising mass marriages for the poor, donating stationery to local school children, or supporting the education of gifted students.
ILGIs have also played a significant role in maintaining communal harmony in villages with substantial Muslim populations. Varshney (2002) finds that the incidence of communal violence is significantly less in rural India compared to cities. In the cities, he found that 'inter-communal' networks forged through 'associational forms of civic engagements' help to promote communal harmony. I found much the same thing in villages with a Muslim population. For example, in a village in North Karnataka, the ILGI leader is the first to visit the mosque and present offerings during Muslim festivals. In some others, before the advent of any festival, either Hindu or Muslim, ILGI and Muslim leaders meet to ensure that the festivities are celebrated without any conflicts or tensions. In some ILGIs different caste groups also seek the support and cooperation of the ILGI during their festivities. Not only do ILGIs resolve conflicts, but they also play an active role in preventing them. Using an elaborate Index of Communal Harmony for 60 Rajasthan villages, Krishna found that the strength of the village council and the extent to which each village possesses "social capital" (i.e. a predisposition to cooperate) were factors 'significantly associated with the level of communal harmony in villages ' (2002: 118-30 ).
All ILGIs raise resources, both cash and kind, for religious festivals. In addition, (a) some raise matching funds for development projects part-funded by state or central governments; and (b) a few raise
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Maryade in the local language Kannada is a value-laden word. The closest equivalent in English is "honour".
Maryade is actually a combination of honour, self-respect and reputation of self and family. It is often used contextually. does not find support in the village in times of need or distress unless he or she openly tenders an apology to the ILGI for violating its dictates. However, the legitimacy of ILGIs and the extent to which they are able to enforce their decisions are somewhat contested. There is a general perception that they no longer enjoy the influence they once did when formal local institutions were relatively weak. But they remain very influential. Villagers, especially women, believe that in a context where they are still distant from the formal law and order mechanisms like the police and the judiciary, there is a need for locally-rooted institutions that provide justice and maintain local law and order.
Interaction with formal local governance institutions
Contrary to widespread belief, ILGIs are not shrinking or fading as elected local government institutions This interaction between ILGIs and FLGIs takes a variety of forms. Before explaining these forms, let me first note that there is even less understanding of this interaction than of other roles and activities of
ILGIs. This is true of ordinary villagers as much as outside observers. Ordinary villagers do not always appreciate the behind-the-scene influence that is wielded by their ILGIs. Villagers tend to view ILGIs and FLGIs as very different institutions: the first principally "social" and operating at the village level and the second "political" and operating at a higher governmental level. This is specifically because in Karnataka
FLGIs usually cover a group of natural villages.
The 1992 constitutional amendment that established an elected three-tier government structure at the The extent of interaction varies from village to village. All five types are present in some places. The extent of interaction depends largely on the strength and influence of ILGIs. The influence is two-way:
ILGIs influence FLGIs, and vice versa. The nature and outcomes of the interaction can be positive in some contexts and negative in others.
Influencing FLGI elections
An important type of interaction between formal and informal institutions is found in the process of electing members to the Grama Panchayats. The average Grama Panchayat (FLGI) in Karnataka represents 5-7,000 people. One representative is elected for a population of 400 on the first-past-the-post principle.
Thus individual ILGIs are able to exercise a decisive influence on one or more electorates. They play a 13 India has a significant tribal population. It is estimated that they constitute about 8 per cent of the total population. Quotas are provided for the tribal population in various spheres to make the governance and development process more inclusive.
14 The first major landmark was the 1983 Act, which introduced a two-tier, elected sub-state level governance structure. A notable feature was 25 per cent reservation for women in these bodies even before this was mandated by the Constitution. Elections under this Act were held in 1987. in four cases all the seats were uncontested, and in 16 villages at least one seat was uncontested. This is 
Overlap of leadership
The control that ILGIs exercise over the selection of candidates to FLGI elections may be used to have the ILGI leadership elected to the FLGIs. Overlap among the leaders of FLGIs and ILGIs is widespread.
In 26 Seats are reserved for women in FLGIs on a rotation basis. For example, if constituency A is reserved for women this term, the reservation may shift to constituency B or C in the next elections thus compelling interested women to contest against men. This has further exacerbated the problem of women's re-election. However the inference arrived at here is based on cases of women who had the opportunity to re-contest elections but were denied that chance by the ILGI. 
Implementation of development projects
In almost all the villages I studied, the ILGI leaders play an important role in negotiating with the formal, local representatives and institutions for benefits to the village even where they have had little involvement in the selection of formal local representatives. This assumes a special significance when the local councillors or representatives are handpicked by the ILGI. In all the villages studied, the elected representatives agreed that they were pressured, subtly or overtly, by the ILGI to secure benefits for the village. The performance of the formal elected leaders is constantly monitored by the ILGI.
The ILGI generally supports the elected members in negotiating with the FLGI for benefits to the village. There are instances of ILGI Yajamana or panchas briefing elected members about the development needs of the village prior to the formal council meeting or accompanying the elected representatives to the FLGI to demand speedy delivery of services or repairs that have been pending. The ILGI constantly puts pressure on the elected members for development projects such as construction or repairs of school buildings and community halls, provision of drinking water, roads, and drainages. This was evident in all the villages visited.
This type of interaction cannot necessarily be construed as negative. It benefits the entire community and it could be argued that it helps to make the elected members more responsive to their electorate, and thus strengthen democracy. However, this relationship is not always benign and to the benefit of the entire community. First, such pressure is unlikely to exist or be effective where there is overlap of leadership. Second, there are instances of ILGIs influencing decisions related to the location of services within the village -such as street lights, water taps, drainage etc -in favour or themselves or of other village elites. This has direct and negative implications for the welfare of the community as whole and the poor in particular.
Selection of beneficiaries
Another sphere where ILGI-FLGI interaction might adversely affect the poor relates to the selection of beneficiaries for government anti-poverty projects. Various anti-poverty programmes (employment, 
Informal resource mobilisation
The role played by ILGIs in informal resource mobilisation has remained under-explored in most rural research. In all the 30 villages studied, ILGIs were involved in some form of informal resource • Constructing an approach road to the village. Villagers also donated tractors, labour and some adjoining land to widen the road.
• Purchasing 4 acres of land for the construction of a high school building in the village, ensuring that female students had easier access to higher education.
•
Purchasing land for building a small hospital in the village.
• Building a community hall which is available free of charge for weddings • A contributory grant of Rs.200,000 for the sanitation programme implemented by the FLGI, with
Rs.100,000 coming from the temple fund, and Rs.100,000 from donations.
In addition, the ILGI leaders have donated land for building a veterinary clinic, and living quarters for the pre-school (agnanwadi) teacher and village nurse. The ILGI has also tried to access money from various formal sources, such as the MLA fund 18 and Hyderabad-Karnatak Development Board, 19 for village development.
This does not necessarily signify that people in this village are intrinsically more willing to contribute towards village development than elsewhere. The ILGI is more innovative and active. It has used its power to mobilise resources, at times in the name of religious activities and the numerous village temples,
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Each Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) is given Rs.40 lakhs as constituency development fund.
19
Development boards were established to redress regional imbalances in development within Karnataka. Hyderabad-Karnatak Development Board mainly deals with the infrastructure development of districts that belong to this region.
and has diverted some of it to development projects. However, villagers perceive that the ILGI has played a key role in village development, and this in turn has motivated them to donate more generously than elsewhere.
Why are ILGIs more effective in local resource mobilisation in one context and less effective in another? This is especially relevant in the context of the growing popularity of development projects with a built-in requirement for matching local contributions and needs further probing.
In addition, in some villages, informal resource mobilisation for village development activities has also been linked to local elections. Where "unopposed" elections have taken place, potential short-listed candidates were asked to contribute to the village fund the equivalent of what their election campaign would cost. These candidates were then "unanimously" elected. The money is usually utilised for village development or for maintaining the village temple (The Times of India, 22 February 2000 and Indian Express, 4 February 2000) . In one village in Mysore district, Rs.25,000/-was mobilised through "unanimous" and negative dimensions but should certainly receive more attention.
Why are ILGIs overlooked?
The previous sections present a more diverse picture of ILGIs than is generally reported or understood. A large body of knowledge exists on informal and "traditional" institutions in India and an equally large body of knowledge is emerging on local governance and democratic decentralisation. But the literature on local governance and democracy has not paid enough attention to the influence of ILGIs on local governance in general and on FLGIs in particular.
Why does this gap exist in our understanding of local governance? There are four potential answers. 3. A particular dimension of the previous point is a tendency to underestimate the constructive capacity of "traditional" institutions, especially their capacity to mobilise and handle significant sums of money. Robert Wade (1986) studied irrigated villages in Andhra Pradesh in the early 1980s and discovered some ILGIs raising larger amounts of money that they used to acquire and manage irrigation water. They raised this money partly by manipulating auctions for liquor licences, and partly by renting out fallow village agricultural land to pastoralists for animal grazing. The size of these resources was a surprise to him and to Indian social science. We still know little about the extent to which ILGIs are involved in resource mobilisation in India generally, but it seems to be much greater than widely assumed.
4. Social science research on informal and "traditional" institutions is more holistic and objective, than media reports. "Traditional" and informal institutions in the Indian countryside have long fascinated social scientists. A rich knowledge on various facets of these institutions has emerged over decades of research. However, a large body of research on these "traditional" institutions by anthropologists (Archer 1984; Bailey 1960; Cohn 1987; Mandelbaum 1970) , sociologists (Beteille 1971; Srinivas 1959) , political scientists (Rudolph and Rudolph 1967) , legal experts (Galanter 1989 ) and political economists (Wade 1988 ) was carried out before the FLGIs were mandated by the Constitution.
Hence, very little is known about the ways in which ILGIs interact with the FLGIs. Few researchers have gone back to study the ways in which pre-existing local institutions at village level adapted when the FLGIs were superimposed on them. Equally, those researching aspects of local democratic institutions have tended to assume the existence of an institutional vacuum at local level, which is filled by the formal local governance institutions. This belief gains credence from the assumption that ILGIs are relics of 'traditional' systems and are shrinking in face of competition from FLGIs and will gradually disappear. Consequently, researchers working on local governance have not paid enough attention to the interface between ILGIs and FLGIs.
Informal local governance: India in comparative perspective
In much of the world and for much of the time, politics and governance are pursued through informal institutions and channels. There is nothing especially remarkable about informality itself in the public sphere. I have used the term "informality" here to label a set of institutions that is important to the local governance of poor, rural societies: institutions, in various ways rooted in notions of "traditionality" and in locally-specific practices, which exercise public authority at local level through mechanisms distinctly different from those employed by "formal" state institutions. If we accept that informality is a matter of degree rather than an absolute characteristic, we can see that a wide variety of institutions, especially in the rural areas of poor countries, can be categorised as informal local governance institutions (ILGIs). Some of them, like the "traditional authorities" found in many African countries, have a formal dimension, in that they are (a) recognised (and perhaps nominated) by formal state institutions and (b) have authority in some domains -such as land allocation, "traditional" courts and "customary justice" -which is recognised and supported by the formal state (Keulder 1998; Schärf 2003; Goodenough 2002) . By contrast, the ILGIs that I studied in Karnataka are almost totally informal, in the sense that their existence is in no way recognised by the state or in state law, and their authority is accepted by state agencies only in very specific contexts. For example, the police may sometimes seek information about the previous decisions of ILGIs in dispute cases that reach them.
Why do we find so many informal -including quasi-formal -local governance institutions in poor Southern countries? The main reason is that states in the South -and especially in countries formerly ruled by European colonial powers -often remained relatively incomplete, especially at local level. It was not worthwhile for the colonial authorities to extend the main institutions of rule, in their standard bureaucratic form, down to the local level. They instead practised variants of what was often termed indirect rule, i.e. they used selected powerful local individuals or families to rule locally in a mode that was formally non-bureaucratic. These "local notables" were not public employees, but were represented as exercising "traditional authority". They were chiefs in much of Africa, zamindars in parts of India, mudaliyars ("headmen") in Sri Lanka (Ceylon), etc. In India the state relied upon these notables not only for revenue collection but also for other services (Krishna 2002). Below these "traditional authorities", at the very local level, were governance institutions that combined, in varying degrees, monopolistic, exclusionary power stemming from association with the "traditional authorities" with some more collectivist structures representing different groups in local societies (Cohn 1971; Frykenberg 1969; Mandelbaum 1970) . In the Karnataka case, "traditional" village panchayats embodied both these elements: they comprised dominant castes and large landowners, but also, through a limited representation principle, permitted a degree of pluralism among these population groups.
In Karnataka -and, to the best of my understanding, in India more generally -the post-colonial history of many of these ILGIs is relatively distinct, especially at the local level. In other countries, and at the level at which zamindars operated in India, these "colonial" ILGIs have been politically unpopular.
Demands for their abolition or radical reform were often intrinsic to nationalist, anti-colonial political programmes. In Sri Lanka, "village headmen" lost their positions in 1956 (Moore 1985) . Kwame
Nkrumah, Prime Minister of the first British colony in Africa to gain independence, not only tried to suppress the powers of Ghana's "traditional chiefs" but also managed to systematically reconstruct "chieftaincy" in the 1950s (Crook 1986; Rathbone 2000) . Similarly, soon after independence President
Mugabe eliminated "traditional leaders" from rural administration in Zimbabwe mainly to 'maintain a monopoly of social control' (Keulder 1998 Krishna (2002: 33-4) found that some had a history that could be dated back to more than 500 years. Despite a substantial increase in the population, the boundaries of these villages have remained largely unchanged. Apart from the persistence of relatively active ILGIs at local level long after the end of colonial rule, there seem to be two general features of Indian informal local governance for which we need to account:
1. First, it seems that, relative to many other countries, ILGIs in India can often reasonably be described as "local village level governments". They perform such a wide range of functions that they approximate to local all-purpose territorial authorities. They are not simply "burial societies", "rural development committees" or "temple committees", as in Sri Lanka (Moore 1985: 228-9 We need then to explain three things: (a) the persistence of relatively active ILGIs in rural India despite the near-complete lack of official recognition or sponsorship; (b) the fact that they often exercise broad, near-territorial authority; and (c) their capacity to interact with and influence formal elected local governments. How do we account for these things? Any explanation given here has to be tentative. I am asking a question that does not seem to have been addressed before in the social science literature. It seems sensible to assume that some kind of ILGIs are likely to emerge in a country like India where there is a relatively stable rural population, often living in quite distinct nucleated villages, under a state that has limited capacity to reach into village society and provide services for villagers. In such circumstances, it seems predictable that ILGIs of some kind should emerge, and that they should have a dual character:
both providing collective services that benefit many people and at the same time embodying local sociopolitical and gender inequality and helping to bolster the beliefs, norms and practices that conform to the interests of dominant groups. In other words, in explaining the pattern of ILGI activity found in India, we should seek less to explain why ILGIs might emerge, and concentrate more on ( citizens, and even to dispossess existing rights holders involuntarily (Keulder 1998; Goodenough 2002; Mamdani 1998 ). Such power is inevitably controversial. The institution that wields it is perpetually vulnerable to the allegation of having used it for private benefit. And there often is a great deal of truth in such allegations. It is difficult to imagine that ILGIs enjoying such powers could survive long in democratic India. They never had to, for two reasons. One is that, relative to much of Africa, the land frontier has long been closed in mainstream rural India. Excepting some relatively marginal (often tribal) agricultural areas and parts of the remote northeast of the country, we can, as a rough approximation, say that the land frontier has been closed since Independence over half a century ago. The second reason stretches further back into history. The colonial authorities, extending the practices already established by pre-colonial rulers, relied heavily for their revenue on a land tax system that typically harvested for the state a high proportion of the value of agricultural output. And that land tax system in turn depended on the early creation and maintenance of an elaborate system of written records of land ownership and use that, in principle at least, contained details on individual land plots and holding in every village. In reality, these records were not fully accurate. But the wonder is that they were so extensive in a poor agrarian society. A necessary corollary to the effectiveness of the land record system was a system of legislation and courts through which major land disputes could be fought. The courts were in reality imperfect and biased institutions. If decisions were made there, they could be influenced by the contents of the land records maintained at village level. Differences over land rights did not always go to court, but were 20
In addition, in some African countries, including Botswana, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Ghana, "traditional authorities" are represented, collectively and/or individually, formally or informally, in national level politics, whether through political parties, individual influence or special representative arrangements. This kind of influence is also likely to generate competition and controversy.
rather "settled" by those who controlled those records. But the important outcome for the purposes of this paper is that, over a long period of historical time, 21 ILGIs in rural India could not alone exercise a major influence over local land allocation, did not control the dominant economic resource, and therefore were not subjected to the stresses, internal conflicts and criticism that such authority tends to generate.
• There exists in India a relatively accessible court system that is widely used by significant sections of the population, for land disputes or other purposes. Similarly, despite their well-known limitations, the police are frequently approached by rural people for assistance of various kinds. Much of the time, some rural people at least have a realistic possibility of approaching formal state institutions to deal with the kinds of issues that generally go to ILGIs. In effect, there is some scope to "appeal" the decisions of ILGIs to higher authorities. And, on some occasions, those higher authorities might be disposed, for ethical reasons or because of political considerations, to take seriously the concerns of members of "backward" sections of society. I guess -and this is not easy to demonstrate with the research methods I have so far employed -that this scope for "appeal" acts as some constraint on the exercise of arbitrary or self-interested authority by ILGIs. 22 Were they to violate accepted norms too blatantly, they would risk an "appeal" that might in turn jeopardise the overall authority of the institution. A recent example from the state of Tamil Nadu illustrates this clearly. When a separated woman sought divorce from her husband, she was not only fined by the ILGI but the custody of the children was awarded to her husband. The fine was reduced only after she prostrated herself in front of each of the ILGI members and leaders. The victim complained to the police and filed a petition in court. The story was also picked up by the newspapers. The presiding judge not only came down hard on the ILGI, but he has also sought an ordinance from the state government to curb such incidents (The Hindu, 18 and 30 September 2003) . My field research indicates that most ILGI leaders are politically sophisticated people. Most are likely to have developed a good appreciation of the broad constraints within which they operate. To quote one Scheduled Caste ILGI member from Mysore District: 'We cannot afford to give wrong decisions as even if one person in the village questions our judgement, it damages the authority of the ILGI'. 23 The slightest transgression on the part of ILGI leaders is taken seriously by the ILGI as it undermines the legitimacy of the institution.
In a Karnataka village, one caste leader, also a member of the ILGI was ostracized by his caste group for misappropriating funds collected for a caste festivity. By losing his position as a caste leader, he also had to forfeit his right to be part of the ILGI. Although he was re-admitted to the caste group after tendering a public apology, reimbursing the money and giving a feast to the caste group, he was 21
It is difficult to provide any precise historical periodisation for this process. The land revenue and record system was well institutionalised before the end of the nineteenth century (Frykenberg 1965 (Frykenberg , 1969 Cohn 1971; Kessinger 1979; Smith 1996) .
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By contrast, in much of Africa, rural populations have very little scope for appealing from traditional authorities to formal courts (Nyamu-Musembi 2003; Schärf 2003) .
23
Personal interview with a Scheduled Caste ILGI member in Mysore district.
not reinstated as a member of the ILGI. Krishna (2002) cites instances from Rajasthan villages where a panch was replaced as he was often found drunk in public and another because he had attempted to take a bribe from a member of an aggrieved party.
• The leadership of ILGIs in India is not inherently monopolistic, in the sense that it is neither The tendency of colonial African governments to replace individual chiefs as it suited them is said to have helped undermine the institution of chieftaincy.
The mention of the multi-caste nature of Karnataka villages in the previous paragraph signals one important respect in which the characterisation of "India" which I have used for comparative purposes may be more appropriate for some parts of the country than for others. It seems almost certain that, for the reasons given in the above paragraphs, multi-caste villages are more likely to experience relatively pluralistic internal politics, less likely to see ILGIs as mechanisms for enforcing the will or social values of a single or highly dominant caste, and therefore more likely to have the benefit of an ILGI which commands wide respect. It is accepted, as a broad generalisation, that villages in South India are more likely to be multi-caste than in North India. Hence, all the reports of oppressive or brutal enforcement of "traditional" behavioural norms cited at the beginning of this paper relate to North India, and to caste panchayats or ILGIs predominantly representing a single caste. This is not to imply that ILGIs in South India are benign institutions, but they seem to be comparatively less oppressive and more pluralistic than their North Indian counterparts. However, we do not yet know enough about ILGIs in different parts of India to determine whether the sketch I have made above really summarises the typical picture.
Concluding comments
In sum, ILGIs in India have two faces. I have sought to present both rather than portray them as either wholly benign or totally oppressive institutions. ILGIs also carry with them the social tensions and gender bias inherent in rural societies. Social conflicts and tensions within the villages are constantly negotiated and managed, sometimes in an oppressive manner, by the ILGIs. Interestingly though, in their interface with FLGIs they project a picture of cohesiveness. Indeed, it is this that makes the interaction possible.
Understanding ILGIs and the interaction between ILGIs and FLGIs has implications for local governance policy. If one wanted to "incorporate" ILGIs into local governance in India, there is scope to influence their composition. 24 This aspect was brought sharply into focus during field visits in Karnataka. Members of a number of ILGIs admitted that although the ILGI is a patriarchal institution (controlled and dominated by older men representing the village establishment) it would have to conform if there is a dictate from the government making participation of women compulsory in this forum (as in the FLGI).
25
The role provided is a facilitative and supportive one with little power to impact decisions.
